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Abstract
When Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, the problem confronting 
Africa continent then was colonialism. It is therefore not a surprise that its major 
preoccupation was how to liberate countries within the continent that were still 
under the grip of colonialism. However, the surge of conflicts in various African 
countries shortly after independence, manifesting in form of ethnicity, religious, 
struggle for political power among others, coupled with OAU policy of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, combined to turn African 
continent to the bedlam of the world. The failure of OAU led to the formation 
of the African Unity (AU) to correct some of these ills. This article examines 
AU’s achievements in the realm of peace and security using secondary sources of 
data gathering. Since AU came on board, how far has it fared in promoting peace 
and security in the continent? Findings reveal that although AU has achieved 
much in the realm of peace and security in Africa, yet it lacks the needed human 
resources and institutional capacity to conduct effective peace operations and 
peace-making initiatives. The study therefore suggested among others the need 
to strengthen AU’s institutional capacity and more personnel should be donated 
by members countries
Keywords
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Introduction
Since the Cold War ended, the role of regional organisations in maintaining 
peace and security cannot be over emphasised. In fact, Faleti and Odobo (2014) 
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postulate that not only are they playing an active role in redrawing international 
security architecture, but they have emerged as viable tools for dealing with secu-
rity challenges across the various regions of the globe. As it were, regional organi-
sations have always been involved in peace-making, prevention of violent 
conflicts between and within members states, mediating among parties in conflict, 
monitoring ceasefire or peace agreement among parties in conflict, implementing 
peace plans among others. In addition, these bodies have engaged in post-conflict 
reconstruction in places where there is humanitarian crisis. One of such regional 
organisation that engaged in such activities is the African Union (AU).
The AU was formed in July 2002. Since the AU was launched, leaders of 
African countries have taken a bold step towards creating African security regime 
for the maintenance of peace, security and managing conflict in the region instead 
of heavy reliance on the international community. The issues are: has the AU 
been able to manage peace and security in Africa better than its predecessors—
Organisation of African Unity (OAU)? If no, why? If yes, how can AU improve 
its performance to maintain peace and security in the region? What are the prob-
lems confronting the AU? How can those problems be addressed?
This article focuses on the progress and achievements of the AU in mainte-
nance of peace and security in Africa. The article draws on extensive secondary 
literature from academics and other secondary sources. Even though there are 
many studies on the AU, there seem to be few studies that focus on the opportuni-
ties and challenges as regards AU’s peace and security agenda (Powell, 2005). 
Following this introduction, the article reviews some related works that have been 
done by scholars before providing a background to AU formation; next is AU’s 
efforts in peace and security in Africa, challenges, recommendations and lastly 
conclusion.
Literature Review
Security has always been an issue of great concern to any human societies. This is 
predicated on the fact that security impinges on survival of every human being or 
society. Without security, there cannot be peace and development as it will be dif-
ficult to harness human and material resources for the benefit of such society. The 
continent of Africa is bedevilled or belaboured by civil strife and intractable con-
flicts within and between states. Suffice to say that anybody who is not a stranger 
to African affairs cannot but be disconcerted by the pervading climate of insecu-
rity and uncertainty in the land (Imobighe, 2001). One of the major reasons for the 
establishment of the AU was the desire to address the various conflicts plaguing 
the continent and to promote peace. For instance, Agu and Okeke (2013) contend 
that prior to the birth of the AU, the OAU in its declaration in Cairo reaffirmed its 
commitment to work jointly and also to expedite actions in resolving peacefully 
conflicts in the region. Thus, it was observed that if there were to be socio- 
economic progress in the continent, then the scourge of conflict must be controlled. 
The organisation then later established a mechanism for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. However, the OAU conflict resolution mechanism 
was rendered ineffective because of its commitment to the principles of 
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sovereignty, non-interference, respect for established borders and territorial integ-
rity of member states (Powell, 2005).
The above and many other issues brought OAU under heavy criticism which 
will be discussed later.
From its founding documents developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is 
clear that the AU was instituted and empowered to play a critical role in resolving 
African conflict. In the light of the above, the principal objective of the AU is the 
emergence of ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own 
citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena’ (AU Commission, 
2009, p. 11). As articulated by the former Chairman of the AU Commission, 
Alpha Oumar Konare, the evolution of the organisation from OAU to AU shows 
a change from the principle and norm of ‘non-interference’ in armed conflicts to 
a new posture of ‘non-indifference’ to member states’ internal affairs. Its conflict 
management plan projects the awareness that the AU’s vision for conflict 
management reflects an understanding that security and stability are the precondi-
tions for achieving effective management of conflict in the continent.
The plan for a continental peace and security steered the founding of the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) in March 2004. The PSC is AU’s foremost decision-
making body saddled with the responsibilities regarding peace and security. 
According to the Article 2(1) of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, PSC is a collective security and 
early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict 
and crisis situations in Africa (AU, 2002). Like the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, AU-PSC is made up of 15 members. They are Algeria, Benin, Angola, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Mali, Rwanda, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Swaziland and Zambia (Murithi, n.d.). There are no permanent members 
with veto power. Five states are elected from each region every 3 years while the 
other 10 states are elected every 2 years based on stated criteria of political 
and financial commitment to the AU and its course, respect for democracy and 
democratic principles, respect for the rule of law and human rights  as well as 
geographical representation (AU, 2002, Art. 5.2g).
The Council was assigned the principal responsibility of implementing the 
broad objectives of anticipating and preventing conflicts; promoting peace, 
security and stability; promoting and implementing peace-building activities; 
encouraging and promoting democratic practices; protecting human rights, the 
rule of law and good governance; developing a common defence policy for the 
AU; harmonising and coordinating efforts to prevent and fight international 
terrorism. In performing these roles, powers ranging from military intervention to 
assist in providing humanitarian assistance among others were granted to the 
Council (AU, 2002, Article 7 of the PSC Protocol). 
Another important organ as stated before is the PSC. Although the AU-PSC 
has been the platform for the maintenance of peace in Africa, there are other struc-
tures or organs established to work with the PSC to make it realise its goals, 
namely the Rapid-Reaction African Standby Force (ASF) that is built across the 
sub-regions, North, East, Southern and East Africa; Panel of the Wise; a Military 
Staff Committee; Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a Peace Fund; 
Humanitarian Acts organs; and Africa Standing Force. Also, UN Peace-building 
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Commission as well as the framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) was established in 2006. The PCRD sought to establish the 
relationship between security, peace and development and stresses the importance 
of multilateralism (Paterson, 2012, p. 11). The backdrop of war and conflict of the 
1990s as well as principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
of 2002 led to the establishment of African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) in the early 2000s (AU Constitutive Act, 2000). The institution and 
instrument was built by AU’s member states, bureaucrats and external donor 
states. The APSA platform is to permit African states and stakeholders to deliber-
ate the obstacles to the actualisation of African peace and security (Berhe & Waal, 
2015). The AU-PSC has under these arrangements recorded noteworthy successes 
in containing conflict in Africa. The next section situates AU within a historical 
context. 
History of African Union (AU)
The history of African Union (AU) cannot be told without reference to the 
Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). From this premise, it is necessary to take a 
historical excursion into the formation of the OAU and why it was replaced with 
the AU. The OAU came into existence on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, when 
representatives of 32 African states signed a charter for the formation of the 
organisation. With the passage of time, 21 other African countries later joined, 
bringing the number to 53 (Zurmeyer, 2005).
As a result of colonial situation as at the time of formation, the OAU had 
onerous responsibility of freeing the continent from European colonialism, racism 
and apartheid among other roles. The implication of this scenario is the fact that 
decolonisation, therefore, became one of the priority tasks of the OAU. Aside 
from its role of liberation of African countries that were then under the grip of 
colonialism, the OAU was also confronted with numerous interstate and intrastate 
conflicts, which afflicted many countries in the continent shortly after their inde-
pendence, from Great Lakes Region to the Horn of Africa, and virtually all the 
regions of the continent. Many of these conflicts originated from the struggles for 
political power, territorial acquisition, religious supremacy and ethnic domina-
tion, others were premised on the denial of popular participation in governance 
and the truncation of democratic process by military intervention in political 
affairs (Shinkaiye, 2005).
The OAU recorded success in its primary mission of liberating the continent 
from colonialism with the help of international actors when finally, on 27 April 
1994, a new government based on one person, one vote became a reality in South 
Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Contrary to expectation, the OAU 
failed in the aspect of monitoring and policing the affairs of its own member 
states. This became obvious as a result of its inability to curb violent conflict, poor 
governance, economic mismanagement, gender inequality, human rights abuse 
and poverty in the region (Murithi, 2012).
Even though in 1993 in Cairo, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, this instrument was ineffective going 
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by its failure to resolve disputes in the continent. It is tragic to discover that the 
Rwandan genocide which started in April 1994 happened shortly after this mecha-
nism became operational. In the same vein, it was also after the operation of 
the mechanism that the conflict that led to the collapse of Somalia, and violent 
conflicts that led to the death of millions of Africans in Angola, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone cropped up. These catastrophic 
events portrayed the weakness of the OAU as a framework for conflict resolution 
(Murithi, 2012).
The failure of the OAU in the realm of peace in Africa is predicated on its 
principle of non-interference with the sovereignty of the member states. In fact, 
this position stems from the ambiguity or misunderstanding as regards the pream-
ble to the OAU Charter of 1963. While the Charter as outlined by the member 
states committed them to collectively maintain and sustain peace and security of 
the continent of Africa, it was later interpreted to mean non-intervention in the 
affairs of member states. Suffice to say that the key organs of the OAU Council of 
Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government could not inter-
vene in any conflict within or between African states excepted invited by the 
parties in dispute (Murithi, 2012).
The implication of this is that the OAU was not legally or operationally to 
either intervene in state or interstate conflict. In short, the African Union (AU) 
came into existence when the African space was suffused with conflicts. This 
development made conflict resolution a major function of the AU. It has also 
given indication that it will do better in this assignment than the defunct OAU. 
Where peaceful resolution has failed, the AU had recourse to military intervention 
(Agu & Okeke, 2013). The AU actually lays out the provisions to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a member state including the use of military force if need be, so 
as to protect vulnerable population from egregious human rights abuses. To AU, 
sovereignty is conditional and is predicated on state’s capability and willingness 
to protect its citizens (Powell, 2005). The next section deals with AU’s efforts in 
peace and security in Africa.
AU’s Efforts in Peace and Security in Africa
For AU to achieve its aim of maintaining peace and security in Africa, it establishes 
conflict management instruments. Thus, AU’s core conflict management instru-
ments include sanctions regimes, mediation initiatives, minimising the occur-
rences of conflicts via peace-making, peacekeeping operations, peaceful negotiations 
and consensual interventions and maintenance of peace (Williams, 2011).
Unlike the OAU that upheld the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
matters of its members, the PSC since its first meeting in 2004 has deployed AU 
missions to conflict zones, for instance, the Comoros, Burundi (2003–2004), 
Sudan, Darfur (2004–2007), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Somalia to mention just a few of them. The AU has sent observers to monitor 
elections in a number of African countries such as Sudan and Somalia. The PSC 
has resolved post-election violence in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire.
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A lot could be deduced from the AU’s peace operations (the table in the 
Appendix gives more information on the AU’s peace operations from 2003 
to 2017). First, it is clear that there is uneven support from AU members for its 
peacekeeping operations. Bulk of the troops for AU peace missions are from a 
collection of very few African countries. Of the 55 members of the AU, the major 
contributing states include Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Benin Nigeria and Egypt. Williams (2009a cited in Bergholm, 2010) posits that 
South Africa provided most of the troops deployed for the missions in Burundi 
(2003–2004) and the Comoros between 2006 and 2008; by early 2008 Uganda 
provided all the troops deployed under the platform of AMISOM to the peace 
operation in Somalia (2007–2012); and South Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal 
were the main contributors of troops for the AU’s operation in Sudan (2004–
2007). This depicts that without the contributions of these small groups of states, 
AU’s peace operations would not have functioned well. The involvement of 
Ethiopia via the provision of contingents to UNAMID and the support it provided 
to South African troops in AMIB is remarkable and commendable. Uganda also 
single-handedly provided troops for AMISOM for about a year before the arrival 
of Burundian troops. African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) recorded mile-
stone success for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and imple-
menting peace-building.
Also, AU’s peace-building role is through the prevention of violence, laying 
foundation for reconciliation as well as reconstruction. Other peace-building 
roles the AU had engaged in include the protection of demobilisation centres that 
oversee the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, the 
integration of former militias into society, protection of returning politicians par-
ticipating in the transitional government and the security of demobilisation 
centres. The AMIB also created platforms for the return of the displaced persons 
and refugees in Tanzania to their homes. At the end of the AU mission in Burundi, 
relative peace was built in most of the Burundi provinces. These successes of the 
AU enabled the establishment of a strong and effective UN peace operation.
The organisation has been able to ensure that forceful military and unconstitu-
tional government take-overs are reverted to democratic rule for better democratic 
consolidation and good governance in Africa. Some of the cases where this has 
been done include Guinea and Mauritania in 2008, Madagascar in March 2009 
and Burkina Faso in 2015. Offending members states are also suspended from the 
AU. They were given about 6 months to conform to its constitution. When 
positive changes are not recorded, due to the obstinate attitude of some states, the 
PSC has had to engage more coercive means of sanction regimes to ensure 
compliance. Sanctions such as travel bans and freezing of regime assets have been 
meted on the individuals tagged as conflict instigators. The sanctions are to cause 
a change to positive political behaviours, be a substitute for armed conflict and 
stigmatise the target. A good case in point is the suspension of Central African 
Republic (CAR) between March 2003 and June 2005 due to military coup.
However, when the sanctions were lifted in 2005, the junta retained power. 
Eritrea was also suspended between April 2009 and January 2011 due to its support 
to insurgents in Somalia. Between December 2010 and April 2011, Ivory Coast 
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was suspended but the incumbent regime declined to hand over power after its 
defeat in the election. UN-France-AU force, however, forced the incumbent regime 
to step down and de jure government assumed office (Williams, 2011). Togo was 
also suspended between February and May 2005 and the Comoros when Mohamed 
Taki Abdoulkarim died in office and his son fraudulently retained power by 
manipulating the election then and also won another election in 2010. In Madagascar, 
Guinea and Niger, the PSC declared some persons in the military junta unquali-
fied to contest in some elections. There are cases when presidents of some signifi-
cant African states such as Uganda and Algeria have abolished the stipulated 
presidential terms in their constitution and held on to power through the manipu-
lation of election results. In such case, the AU-PSC lacked the capability to 
enforce sanctions against such elements for change (Omorogbe, 2008). 
The AU approach to peace-making in the post-Cold War era reflects its member 
states’ preference for consensual decision-making conducted out of the public 
glance between the belligerent factions and the PSC. It involves the bargain among 
elites in arriving at a workable power-sharing agreements. A good example is the 
power-sharing agreement and deployment of 462 troops to support elections in 
the Comoros in May 2006 (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). The drastic fall in the occur-
rences of coups and conflict as well as the increase in the number of successful 
elections in Africa in the past few decades are positive inferences that AU has 
been able to balance the actions of states and added to the political performances 
and values (Lisk, 2012). Other cases where AU had monitored power-sharing 
arrangements include Sudan, Ivory Coast, Chad and Zimbabwe (2008–2009), 
Libya and Liberia (1994–2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2007) and Central African 
Republic (1996–2007) (Mehler, 2008). The next section focuses on challenges 
facing AU.
Challenges
AU’s efforts towards peace and security have not been all smooth outing. 
The organisation has faced a number of challenges in the pursuit of the continental 
agenda. One of the challenges it faces is the conflict between international mecha-
nisms to protect and promote justice, the rule of law and African regionalism and 
respect for human rights. For instance, there was the resolution of the AU to move 
its July 2012 bi-annual summit from Lilongwe, Malawi to Addis Ababa in reac-
tion to Malawi’s refusal to visit Omar Al-Bashir, Sudan’s Head of State on the 
pretext that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has charged and pronounced a 
warrant for Omar al-Bashir’s arrest for war crimes (Lisk, 2012). Malawi felt that 
going by the record of human rights abuse of Al-Bashir of Sudan, there was no 
basis for such visit.
The AU lacks the needed human resources and institutional capacity to conduct 
effective peace operations and peace-making initiatives. For instance, the internal 
assessment conducted by the AU reveals that the PSC itself suffers from limited 
personnel. The PSC lacks translators and dedicated legal experts. It has just 
one secretary, four professional staff and an administrative assistant (APSC, 
2010, para 75–77). Apart from the issues at the PSC, AU Commission also lacks 
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effective management system, human resources, lacks motivated personnel and 
professionals; it has weak bureaucratic processes, poor information technology 
and weak reputation among member states (AU Commission, 2009, p. 17). 
The absence of adequate personnel also affects the African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crises and undermines its ability to have ready to deploy personnel 
as it was the case in Mali despite the early warning (AU, 2013). 
The AU headquarters is also bedevilled with difficulties in planning, limited 
logistical support and force generation when compared vis-à-vis other continental 
bodies embarking of operations of similar sizes. Williams (2011) avers that at 
each stage of the AU’s peacekeeping mission life cycle, that is, planning, deploy-
ment, operations and withdrawal, there are peculiar institutional challenges posed 
at the AU. While on the field, there are difficulties in assembling and retaining 
teams of qualified senior leaders, which includes the special representative, police 
commissioner, force commander and chief administrators. 
Following the above challenge is AU’s capacity to organise the military assets 
and personnel needed for peace operations. Generally, AU lacks specialist and 
professionals such as engineers and skills for intelligence gathering. Paterson 
(2012) argues that although the AU missions in Darfur, Somalia and Burundi were 
commendable, they also uncovered the organisation’s logistical, financial weak-
nesses and capacity in terms of training, coordination, transport and equipment. 
Therefore, to fill these gaps, AU relies on external sources for personnel, equip-
ment, funding and training. A callable example is the situation the Burundian 
forces faced in AMISOM. In Mogadishu, they lacked military equipment such as 
battle tanks which the US government eventually provided. The AMISOM also 
lacked the mortar radar system that could have reduced civilian casualties. 
Generally, the military equipment the AU lacked in tensed military situations 
like in its operations in Somalia and Sudan include attack and utility helicopters, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, communications and intelligence equipment, night 
vision goggles and armoured personnel carriers. 
The AU is also faced with the problem of insufficient experts with conflict 
management abilities. There is deficit of experts in security institutions such as 
justice, police and correction officers. It also lacks adequate experts as far as 
application of democratic principles, rule of law and mediation is concerned. 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which was also restated in article 4 of the 
Protocol to the Constitutive Act on the PSC, recognises the power of the AU to 
mediate in any member state in grave situations of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide; pulling continental strengths in the deterrence and fight-
ing of terrorism, intervening in cases of human right abuses, enforcing sanctions 
in case of undemocratic change of government, authorise peace support missions, 
and to ‘take initiatives and action it deems appropriate’ in retort to latent or actual 
conflicts (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, p. 1; Paterson, 2012, p. 11; Zoubir, 2013, 
p. 50). Due to the shortage of experts with mediation capability, persons appointed 
as mediation agents though persons of high societal calibre lack the experience 
and expertise to analyse conflict for the right cause and take appropriate media-
tion initiative. At other times, parties in most mediation processes are dictated by 
the key personalities involved in the conflict (Nathan, 2009). Therefore, AU has 
weak enforcement capabilities for peaceful negotiations. For instance, although 
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the AU responded in the Libyan civil war through diplomacy and negotiated 
settlement and provided for political negotiation between the Libyan government 
and the oppositions for the transformation of Libya to a democratic system 
through immediate ending of all warfare and the acceptance and enactment of 
political reforms crucial for the elimination of the causes of the Libyan crisis, the 
opposition rebels rejected AU’s political roadmap while Ghadaffi accepted it. 
Therefore, a truce could not be reached and the war continued until foreign inter-
vention by the UN and NATO.
Weak democratic governance is one of the structural causes of protracted 
conflict African countries face. Maru (2013, p. 36) avers that the uprising in North 
Africa exposed the weakness of Africa to violence and revolution, the illegitimate 
exercise of power phenomena that are indicative of the undemocratic nature of 
states, as well as the weakness of constitutional and peaceful avenues to change 
government. Military coups have also been a critical challenge to democracy in 
Africa. Madagascar witnessed a coup in 2009, Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012. 
African countries have been challenged by poverty despite their vast ownership of 
rich resources. Major conflicts, wars and insurgencies have been somehow linked 
to the economic frustrations, deprivations and poverty. Some of the cases in recent 
time include the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria and the militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. It is imperative to mention that 
sects such as the Boko Haram have become a threat to regional and global peace 
and security, meaning that the AU has a major security concern at hand.
Another challenge AU faces is the long amount of time it takes the PSC to 
make decisions after a crisis has been identified (Toga, 2016). Reasons behind 
this challenge include poor political will of African leaders and the lack of deep 
interest on AU matters (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, p. 1). To Baker (2007, p. 121), 
these issues have made AU’s responses slow, ineffective and logistically clumsy. 
The AU was also unable to effectively take strong sanctions and measures against 
the governments of Tunisia and Egypt for the violations of human rights and 
forceful attacks on civilians during peaceful protests. Guesh (2013, p. 69) specifi-
cally notes that AU refused to issue any statement of condemnation on President 
Hosni Mubarak until he stepped down from power as it was in the case of Gbagbo. 
Additionally, despite the early warning from Continental Early Warning 
System (CEWS) about the outbreak of conflict in Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012, 
the PSC did not take preventive actions against the conflict. Early and timely 
intervention of the AU in the conflicts could have prevented the indiscriminate 
killings of civilians, prevention of other crimes against humanity and the enact-
ment of no-fly zones (Kabau, 2012). The AU’s actions appeared to oppose the 
essence of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which orders the AU to carry out 
forceful intervention in such situations. If this had been done, the crisis would not 
have degenerated to uncontrollable situation, leading to crimes against humanity. 
These exemplified the deficiency of the AU in promoting effective and forceful 
intervention where necessary. In summary, AU has not been able to establish a 
synergy between state sovereignty and the need for humanitarian intervention.
In the case of the Libyan Crisis that began in February 2011, the AU-PSC 
established an Ad Hoc High-Level Committee made up of the heads of state of 
five countries: Mauritania, Mali, Republic of Congo, Uganda and South Africa 
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(Bartu, 2014). The AU could not arrive at a decision on the policy that could be 
implemented to calm the crisis without undermining the sovereignty of Libya. 
Agreeing on a policy was undermined by the conflicting interest among AU 
members. Mahadew (2011) avers that the reason for the slow intervention in 
Libya is Ghadaffi’s influence over the AU. Ghadaffi has a very strong influence 
over the AU by virtue of his charisma and being a major contributor to the AU 
budget. The AU was severely divided between countries that had enjoyed 
Ghaddafi’s generosity and political support and those that had been grieved from 
his interferences, such as Sudan and Ethiopia and most West African states like 
Nigeria. In fact, from the beginning of the crisis both Tunisia and Sudan supported 
the National Transitional Council (NTC) based in Benghazi. Sudan provided sig-
nificant ammunition, weapon and direct military support to rebel groups and the 
Islamist-led government in Tripoli (Waal, 2013). The decision of the PSC to 
pursue a political negotiation resolution was also constrained by the conflicting 
interest of external actors mostly channelled through the UN and its resolution.
The AU’s slow intervention in Libya crisis had neocolonial implications on 
Africa and Libya as a country. One of the manifestations of neocolonial manifes-
tations was the West specifically, NATO, UN, US, France and UK’s disrespect of 
AU’s political dialogue approach towards resolving conflict in Libya. The NATO 
enforced airstrikes over Libya despite the AU’s dictate against it and despite pro-
nouncement of the no-fly zone against Libya. The airstrikes empowered the rebel 
forces NTC to enter Tripoli in August 2011 and gain military successes on ground 
(Guesh, 2013, p. 65). This meant that NATO and the Security Council saw the AU 
as incapable of managing its own affair and needed the assistance of the powers. 
In fact, an additional instance that showed the disrespect of the AU by foreign 
powers is that notwithstanding the fact that the AU reacted to the launching of air 
attacks by the USA, France and the UK on targets in Libya on 20 March 2011, AU 
could not muster enough force against the Western countries to put an end to the 
air strikes (Neethling, 2012). 
This has political underpinning as Jean-Paul Pougala contends that the major 
essence for Western countries to wage war against Libya was because of the threat 
that Colonel Ghaddafi posed to them. Ghaddafi had contributed US$300 million 
for the establishment of the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation 
(RASCOM), by which Europe lost US$500 million annually for the hire of its 
satellite by Africa for communication. He opposed EU’s vision of a Union for 
Mediterranean (UPM), a plan to make the northern Arab African countries 
detached from the main African continent. Thus, the revolt of the Libyan people 
against the 42 years reign of Ghaddafi was embraced by Western-led coalition of 
NATO and UN as an avenue to unseat Ghadaffi.
The AU’s inability to protect civilian, for instance, in Mogadishu, Somalia and 
Darfur during their peace operations in the areas is another indictment on the 
organisation. NGOs, INGOs, state governments and even rebels have accused the 
AU of human rights violations and violation of international humanitarian law. 
This issue has been complicated by the absence of accountability and mechanisms 
to investigate and prosecute such acts (Itziar, 2011).
The AU’s dependence or over reliance on foreign funding for the Peace 
Fund is another challenge impeding its success in the realm of peace and security. 
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The Peace Fund has the responsibility of providing the necessary funds for AU’s 
peace operations and other running costs for its operations but has been sternly 
underfunded. Many African governments have failed to adequately finance peace-
keeping operations and the effective running of the AU’s bureaucracies needed to 
manage peacekeepers and the centres of excellence to train future peacekeepers 
(Malan, n.d.). Since 1 January 2006, 75 per cent of the total AU budget has been 
paid by only five countries: Egypt, Algeria, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria 
(Williams 2009b, p. 619 cited in Bergholm, 2010). While there has been a rise in 
the amount raised by the Peace Fund since 2006, it has been inadequate to effec-
tively fund the AU’s conflict management operations and does not provide the 
bulk of the funds needed for peace operations. Yearly, the cost of African peace 
operation ranges between US$134 and 900 million (Nathan et al., pp. 77–78 cited 
in Albuquerque, 2016). Due to this huge financial involvement in peace opera-
tions, only one of every five AU-led peace operation has been funded by the AU 
budget between 2009 and 2015 (Nathan et al., pp. 77–78 cited in Albuquerque, 
2016). In short, Mwanzia (2015) avers that AMISOM received about US$800 
million from the UN between mid-2008 and mid-2012. Other financial supports 
for AU’s peacekeeping are mostly from states within NATO and the EU. Due to 
the financial weakness of Africa and the reliance on foreign funding for the running 
of the affairs of the AU, foreign powers and donors have undermines AU’s 
approach to conflict management, namely African solutions first. Additionally, 
dependent on foreign aid, could be an impediment to the independent functioning 
of the AU. For example, China donated a brand new US$200 million building gift 
to the AU in February 2012. With an understanding of the politics of foreign aid, 
there is the possibility that such aid is to access Africa’s resource, market and 
favours at Africa’s developmental detriment (Ramachandran, 2012). 
Recommendations
The AU has been a vehicle for cooperation and advancement of peace and secu-
rity as a panacea for development. However, the AU continues to have limited 
influence over some strategic decisions that are dominated by multilateral bodies 
and western powers. Therefore, for a stable and peaceful Africa to be sustained, 
there are some recommendations for the PSC and the AU in general. First, in rela-
tion to the peace-building as well as peacekeeping, the AU should endeavour to 
draft new strategies that will address the root or cause of the conflicts in Africa 
as to reduce the occurrences of conflict and the long duration of conflicts in the 
continent. The conflicts are not exclusive in themselves. African leaders should 
try as much as possible to address the causes of the conflicts. For instance, the 
establishment of infrastructure should become a priority and employments should 
be readily available this is because the presence of these will enhance the capacity 
of the continent to domesticate regional norms. In addressing the economic causes 
of the conflicts and underdevelopment on the continent, restrictions on goods and 
services such as delays at the borders and increased transaction costs, despite the 
signings of protocol in regard to facilitating free movement of goods and services 
should be resolved. 
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As already mentioned, one of the challenges of the AU is the negotiation power 
of the AU leaders. Although Africa claims not to need external intervention or 
influence in its matters, however, the limited capacity of the leaders in negotia-
tion, administration so far has proven disappointing. Therefore, this article recom-
mends that capable leaders should be appointed as the spokespersons of the 
continent on matters of global concerns to ensure better positive results. 
The AU must address logistics and financial weaknesses. The reliance of exter-
nal funding has been a major bane to the success of the AU as it has affected 
diverse areas such as peacekeeping operation, provision of equipment, deploy-
ment of troops and various administrative needs. The new funding decision of 
having at least 75 per cent of AU funding for peace operations provided by the 
international community and 25 per cent of the needed funds by the AU will not 
address the current funding challenge faced by the AU (Albuquerque, 2016). 
Therefore, the AU needs to implement strategies that will drive more effective 
mobilisation of funds from its members for its peace operation and the effective 
running of its institutions. The divisions of financial responsibilities according to 
the abilities of its members should be employed.
The lack of and delay in reaching political agreement among African leaders on 
collective security norms and practices should be reduced or absolutely eradicated.
 AU needs to be more firm in its use of force. The organisation’s conflict man-
agement strategy lack effective coercive measures to ensure compliance of its 
members and implement forceful intervention as provided under Article 4(h) of 
its Constitutive Act and as proposed under the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
concept where and when consensual interventions and peaceful negotiations are 
inappropriate or inadequate. This is evident in places like Burundi, Sudan, Darfur 
and Somalia in which intervention and peacekeeping were founded on the 
approval of the territorial state and when the involved state refuses AU’s proposed 
peacekeeping operations, AU defers such operations at the detriment of people’s 
rights. The AU Security Council should improve its strength to mediate effec-
tively and enhance its ability to implement regional norms at national levels.
Conclusion
The AU was set up to replace the OAU which was saddled with the responsibility 
of securing the sovereignty of the individual African state, ensuring the decoloni-
sation of the continent and also promoting the unification and enhance all round 
prosperity of the nation. Furthermore, a major and critical goal of the AU this 
research is concerned about is also to promote peace and security of the continent 
in the twenty-first century and beyond. However, the performance of the AU in the 
sphere of peace and security has been challenged and limited in the face of increas-
ing devastating conflicts, underdevelopment and economic dependence, corrup-
tion, lack of institutions, lack of adequate internal funding religious fundamentalism 
and absence of social amenities. Thus, in order to ensure and achieve more giants’ 
strides in the realm of peace and security, African leaders must address those 
factors that impede its strategic goals and weakens African’s voice in global 
politics and multilateral decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council. 
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